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Gruner: Constructed and Enhanced Equities Under eBay

CONSTRUCTED AND ENHANCED EQUITIES UNDER EBA Y:
WHOSE RIGHT IS IT ANYWAY?

Richard S. Gruner*
This article treats the injunction issuance standards announced in eBay
Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 1 as the starting point for patent enforcement
planning by sophisticated clients and their patent and corporate
attorneys. The eBay standards imply a set of circumstances in which a
patent holder will be well-positioned to obtain a patent enforcement
injunction, circumstances that patent holders may be able to reach
through well-crafted strategic moves. This article explores the actions
that a pure licensee patent holder can take to improve its position and
establish "constructed equities" that will enhance its chances of
obtaining a patent enforcement injunction.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court's holding in eBay2 indicates that the net
desirability or "equity" of granting an injunction barring use of a
patented invention will govern remedies for patent infringement.3 The
Supreme Court identified four factors to be considered by courts in
assessing the desirability of a patent enforcement injunction stopping a
defendant's infringing actions.4 These factors focus primarily on the
circumstances of the patent holder and the infringer in a given case. In
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eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 126 S.Ct. 1837 (2006).
Id.
Id. at 1839.
See id
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particular, three factors-the scope of irreparable harm suffered by the
patent holder if infringement continues, the sufficiency of a damage
remedy to compensate the patent holder if no injunction is forthcoming,
and the relative harm to the patent holder and patent infringer if an
injunction is withheld or granted-all depend on the nature of the party
seeking patent enforcement and that party's use of the patented
invention. The fourth factor-the impact of an injunction on the public
interest6 -is less dependant on the circumstances of the patent holder
and would appear have the same influence on the patent injunction
analysis regardless of the identity of the patent holder seeking an
injunction and the nature of that party's use of the patented invention.
Some commentators have speculated that patent holders who are
pure licensors of their rights-that is, entities that hold patents but which
do not use them to protect product production and sales activities or the
offering of a patented service and instead aggressively seek to force
other parties to license their patented inventions through actual or
threatened litigation-may generally be precluded from obtaining an
injunction under the four factor test announced in eBay.7 These pure
licensors-dubbed "patent trolls" by those who would disparage themmay see the value of their patents drop because these parties will only be
able to bargain for lesser licensing royalties once their patents lack the
ability to stop infringers' conduct through an injunction.
This article argues that the ability of patent trolls and other pure
licensors to obtain patent enforcement injunctions is not so simply
evaluated. In particular, the injunction enforcement capabilities of pure
licensors of patents may be fluid in two key respects.
First, a pure patent licensor may change its activities and
characteristics-either by altering its conduct or by joining with other
entities that have other characteristics-and thereby take on features that
will qualify it for an injunction. For example, a pure patent licensor may
join in a joint venture or exclusive licensing relationship with another
party that is a maker or user of the patented invention. If patent
enforcement is sought by either this joint venture or exclusive licensee,
the characteristics of the joint venture or the exclusive licensee will
presumably be the ones considered in the eBay analysis. By bringing
5. Id.
6. id.
7. See, e.g., Keith E. Broyles & William Hubbard, Repelling Patent Trolls After eBay, 18
No. 9 Intell. Prop. & Tech. L.J. 5 (2006); Todd Klein, eBay v. Mercexchange and KSR Int'l Co. v.
Teleflex, Inc.: The Supreme Court Wages War Against Patent Trolls, 112 Penn St. L. Rev. 295

(2007).
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into the picture a significant production or use of the patented invention,
the patent holder may be able to focus the injunction analysis on the
impact of infringement on the producer or user of the invention and the
need for an injunction to maintain exclusive markets for the use or
manufacturing of that invention. Such an equitable position would seem
to be substantially stronger under the eBay tests-that is, more likely to
obtain a patent enforcement injunction-than the position of a mere
licensor of the patented invention.
Second, even if a pure patent licensor is seen as lacking the
characteristics that would justify an injunction for enforcement of the
patent, such an entity may be able to recoup the economic value of
injunctive enforcement by simply transferring its patent rights through a
patent assignment to a party that will be a maker or user of the patented
invention. The use or making of the patented invention by the patent
assignee-and that party's enhanced opportunity to obtain an
injunction-will probably mean that the assignee will be willing to pay
for the assignment at a valuation level that reflects the right to obtain an
injunction. In short, if an assignee feels that it will probably be able to
enforce a given patent with an injunction, the assignee will be willing to
pay a price that reflects the injunction enforcement power of the patent
and the original holder will be able to gain the economic value of the
patent at these injunction-enforced levels, even though the patent
assignor would not have been able to gain an injunction to enforce its
patent.
These sorts of manipulations of circumstances that associate patent
rights with the making or using of a patented invention are means of
giving patent trolls (or their successors) equitable positions that
strengthen their arguments in favor of obtaining injunctions in enforcing
their patents. Where these types of additional activities are not
undertaken as shams but have real economic substance, patent trolls may
be able to use these types of "constructed equity" to obtain injunctions
under the eBay standards.
This article briefly summarizes the potential fluidity of patent
enforcement by "patent trolls" in light of these notions of constructed
equity and conduct positioning.
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II. THE FLUIDITY OF EQUITY FACTORS AFFECTING THE LEGITIMACY OF
INJUNCTIONS-REASONS FOR MEASURING EBA Y FACTORS IN

CIRCUMSTANCES PRESENT WHEN INJUNCTIONS ARE SOUGHT
The goals of equity limitations on injunctions-limitations that the
eBay court indicated should apply to patent-based injunctions in the
same manner as to other types of injunctions--suggest that the
legitimacy of an injunction in a given case should depend on the then
current circumstances of the plaintiff and defendant at issue. This need
for consideration of the present circumstances of the parties (as opposed
to the earlier circumstances of the original patent holder or inventor) is
implied by the goals of equity limitations on injunctions. The need to
consider current circumstances of the parties in turn suggests that the
governing equities-and, therefore, the likelihood of injunction
issuance-are malleable characteristic's which patent holders and
associated parties can modify to enhance their changes of obtaining
injunctions. This section examines the basis for evaluating injunctions
based on the evolving circumstances of patent holders and infringers.
The next section addresses the means that patent holders and related
parties can use to plan for and carry out actions that increase their
likelihood of obtaining patent enforcement injunctions.
The need to consider the current circumstances surrounding a
patent holder and an alleged infringer in determining whether a patent
enforcement injunction should issue is implied by several components of
the test endorsed in eBay. In particular, current considerations-as
opposed to the historical circumstances of the patent holder or
infringer-are relevant in considering 1) a plaintiffs need for an
injunction in light of the nature of the harm to the plaintiff and the
adequacy of other remedies to correct that harm, 2) the relative harm to a
patent holder and infringer of granting or withholding a patent, and 3)
the level of public harm that will result if a patent enforcement
injunction issues.
A. Needfor an Injunction to Remedy Otherwise UnaddressedHarm
In part, equitable tests for the issuance of injunctions are aimed at
limiting the number of injunctions that issue to those which have a clear
justification and which are necessary to further remedial ends that cannot

8. eBay, 126 S.Ct. at 1840.
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be reached through other remedies. 9 The desire to avoid both the judicial
administrative costs and the potentially overbroad conduct restrictions
that may result from issuance of a patent enforcement injunction means
that a plaintiff is required to show that the nature of the plaintiffs harm
and the features of other remedies indicate that a significant aspect of0the
plaintiffs injuries will be unremedied if an injunction does not issue.'
This type of showing of a plaintiffs need for an injunction should
depend on consideration of the present circumstances of the plaintiff as
those circumstances change.
Were a court to consider only past
circumstances, a case in favor of a patent enforcement injunction might
be made and an injunction might issue where such an injunction was not
needed in present circumstances to prevent harm to the patent holder.
Conversely, if historical circumstances were controlling, a patent holder
with a real present need for an injunction to avoid harm (but no similar
case based on its past circumstances) would be forced to be content
without an injunction and to suffer the resulting harm produced by its
present circumstances. Hence, if the aim of equity considerations of
irreparable harm and the adequacy of non-injunctive remedies is to limit
injunctions to incidents where injunctive relief serves a necessary,
incremental function not attainable through other remedies, the adequacy
of non-injunctive remedies must be assessed in light of the current
circumstances of the patent holder when infringing actions of a
defendant and resulting harm to the plaintiff occur.
B. ComparativeHarm to PatentHolder and Infringer
Furthermore, even where there is some justification and need for an
injunction to provide a remedy to a given patent holder, eBay indicates
that the relative impacts of withholding and granting an injunction on the
patent holder and infringer should also be considered. Where the
benefits to a patent holder from obtaining an injunction are small and the
negative impacts on the enjoined party will be large, there is a
substantial case in equity for withholding the injunction. This balancing
process will typically offset the potential weakening of a patent holder's
interest and patent value if only a damage remedy is available against the
possibility that the granting of an injunction will affect the restricted
party in broad ways unrelated to that party's wrongful actions or will
achieve unreasonable harm due to unfair surprise to the restricted party
9. See, e.g., Gene R. Shreve, FederalInjunctions and the Public Interest, 51 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 382, 388-89 (1983).

10. Id.
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about the need to avoid the infringing conduct that is the focus of a
proposed injunction.
Remission of plaintiff to a damage proceeding may debase the
value of his right, but the issuance of an injunction may exact an
exaggerated cost from the defendant. The injunction's purpose is to avert
harm to the plaintiff by incapacitating the defendant. Incapacitation
poses the threat of adjusting more aspects of the defendant's behavior
than those that would wrong the plaintiff if the injunction were not
issued. It is difficult if not impossible to so finely adjust an order that it
protects plaintiff without impairing defendant's harmless activities or the
rights of those who are not represented before the court.11 The net
balance of harm to a patent holder and an infringer from the issuance or
withholding of a patent enforcement injunction will be an evolving
feature. This net figure will depend on the changing circumstances and
harm of both the patent holder and infringer. Since the objective of this
portion of the eBay analysis is to avoid the infliction of new net harm
through the issuance of a patent enforcement injunction, the
circumstances of the parties at the time an injunction is sought should be
considered to determine if new, higher levels of total harm-taking into
account the impacts on both the patent holder and infringer-will follow
from the issuance of an injunction.
C. Harm to the Public
Finally, the need under eBay to consider the impairment of the
public interest from an injunction indicates that a patent enforcement
injunction should sometimes be withheld even if it is otherwise justified
where the public as a whole will suffer in a significant way from the
enforcement of the injunction. This implies that harm to the public may
trump harm to the individual rights holder, suggesting a second,
somewhat different balancing analysis than the comparison of harms to
the rights holder and the potentially restricted party. 12 In settings where
the enforcement of an injunction will have a particularly adverse impact
on some governmental function or will harm public health or some other
public interest in a significant way, the private interests of the rights
holder must simply give way to the public interest.
However, since this type of reduction of enforcement also
diminishes the certainty of rights scope and the value of patent

11. Id. at 389 (footnotes omitted).
12. See id. at 397- 405.
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incentives, this type of restriction on patent enforcement injunctions
should only be imposed where the public's interest and the adverse
impact of an injunction upon it are clear. This further suggests that, to
minimize the circumstances where an injunction is withheld and the
normal enforcement expectations of a patent rights holder are not
fulfilled, the analysis of the public's interest and the implications for the
public interest of a patent enforcement injunction should only consider
real conflicts between an injunction and the public interest that are
concrete and significant at the time that an injunction is sought. Past
conflicts that are no longer present or future conflicts that are speculative
and may not arise should not be bases for withholding an injunction on
public interest grounds since to do so would restrict a patent holder's
rights without necessarily advancing the public interest. In short, the
essential justification for withholding normal patent incentives and
rewards in cases where the public interest demands limited patent
enforcement is only present where the public interest gains from limited
patent enforcement are clear and immediate. This implies that the
current public interest implications of patent injunction enforcement
which are measurable with some certainty are the only public interest
factors that should figure in the eBay analysis and that the past or
potential but uncertain future implications of such enforcement should
be disregarded.
III. CONSTRUCTED EQUITY-IMPROVEMENT OF LIKELIHOOD OF PATENT
INJUNCTION ENFORCEMENT THROUGH TARGETED ACTIONS

There are several means that a pure licensor patent holder can use
to improve its likelihood of obtaining a patent enforcement injunction
under the eBay standard or that such a party can use to realize a
commercial value for a patent that takes into account injunctive
enforcement powers associated with the patent. This short article will
not attempt to survey all such methods. Rather, it will concentrate on
three examples: the enhancement of injunctive enforcement rights of a
patent holder through 1) a joint venture, 2) an exclusive license, and 3)
an assignment of a patent.
A. Patent Enforcement Through a Joint Venture
If a pure licensor patent holder wishes to maintain some ongoing
involvement in the decision making leading to requests for injunctive
relief against infringers, the patent holder may wish to join with a
manufacturer or user of the item to form a joint venture. A joint venture
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is a form of partnership having a specified duration 13 (for example, for
the remaining life of a particular patent or a particular commercialization
effort) and is governed by partnership law. Where a participant in a joint
venture is the holder of a key patent controlling an invention needed by
the joint venture, the patent holder may either assign the patent (that is
transfer ownership of the patent) to the joint venture or, more
commonly, issue an exclusive license to the joint venture designating the
latter as the sole party that is authorized to use the patented invention
within the joint venture's area of activity.' 4 As a patent assignee, the
joint venture would have the full ability to enforce the relevant patent; as
an exclusive licensee, it would have the ability to seek enforcement5 to
prevent patent infringement within the scope of its exclusive license.'
Under partnership laws governing joint ventures, unless the
authority of the partners (that is, joint venturers) is specially limited in
their partnership agreement (which would be the agreement setting up a
joint venture in that type of partnership), each of the partners is a general
and authorized agent of the partnership for all purposes within the scope
and objectives of the partnership.' 6 This means that each partner
(including the partner assigning a key patent to a joint venture or
providing an exclusive license under a patent) will have the authority to
take actions carrying out the normal course of the partnership's business.
For a partnership holding a patent that protects an important feature of
its business, the ordinary business activity of the partnership will
probably include initiating actions to enforce the patent, meaning that
the original holder of the patent before the joint venture was formed
would be in a position to control the enforcement of the patent, but in
circumstances where the enforcement of the patent and the scope of
injunctive relief that might be obtained will be cloaked with the
circumstances of the joint venture, which may include substantial
manufacturing or use of the patented invention.
In sum, a patent holder might participate in a joint venture with an
invention manufacturer or user, thereby gaining new business
characteristics that would alter the patent enforcement injunction
analysis under eBay while retaining control over how the relevant patent

13. See Joint Venture Distinguishedfrom Other Relationships, 46 Am. Jur. 2d Joint Ventures
§ 5 (2007).
14.

See generally Christopher J. Mugel, Strategic Alliances and Other Joint Development

Agreements in Practising Law Institute, Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property
Course Handbook 858 PLI/Pat 365, 394 (2006).
15. See Donald S. Chisum, 8-21 Chisum on Patents § 21.03 (2007).
16. See Authority andAgency of Partners,59A Am. Jur. 2d Partnership § 207 (2007).
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is enforced and when injunctive relief is sought. For example, suppose
party A is an owner and pure licensor of a specific patent and party B is
a party capable of manufacturing the patented item. A and B form a
joint venture to manufacture the patented item under commercially
reasonable and substantial terms (that is, the transaction is not a sham,
but rather is constructed on terms that are typical of such arrangements
and have independent economic substance and merit beyond their
advantages in patent enforcement). As part of the formation of this joint
venture, A contributes ownership of the relevant patent to the joint
venture. As an asset of the joint venture, the enforcement of the patent
could be controlled by any partner-A for instance-and yet would be
undertaken by a party-the joint venture -which has features such as
the production of the patented invention that enhance the likelihood that
the eBay standard will be met and that an injunction will issue. In short,
the joint venture has provided a vehicle towards enhanced or
"constructed" equity and the increased likelihood of injunction issuance
and enforcement.
B. PatentEnforcement In Conjunction with an Exclusive License
It is a well-established rule that an exclusive licensee of a patent has
the right to initiate a patent enforcement action to stop infringement
17
within the scope of activity covered by his or her exclusive license.
For example, if A holds a patent and grants B an exclusive license to
produce the patented invention in the state of New York, B could in turn
bring a patent enforcement action to prevent another unlicensed party C
from making the patented item in the state of New York. This type of
patent enforcement by an exclusive licensee is allowed in recognition
that once an exclusive license is in place, the exclusive licensee has the
strongest interest in patent enforcement and the licensor may have
limited reasons to actively pursue patent enforcement (as opposed to just
seeking royalties and contract remedies from the licensee under the
exclusive license).
What this arrangement suggests is that a pure licensor patent holder
may be able to orchestrate increased injunctive enforcement of a patent
by granting strategically targeted exclusive licenses to parties whose
production or use activities will conflict with particular infringers. For
example, suppose party A is an owner and pure licensor of a particular
patent and party C begins infringing that patent. Party A might enter

17. See Donald S. Chisum, 8-21 Chisum on Patents § 21.03 (2007).
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into an exclusive license with B under which B is authorized to
undertake the type of activity already engaged in by C. B would then
have a strong motivation to enforce the patent involved against C.
Assuming that B started its own activity under the exclusive license-for
example, manufacturing the patented item if this was what the license
covered-then B would come to court with many of the features of a
patent enforcer that eBay suggests would heighten the likelihood that an
injunction would issue to stop C's continued infringement. Hence,
through the issuance of this sort of exclusive license, A has increased the
likelihood of injunctive enforcement of A's patent.
C. Patent CommercializationThrough Assignments ofRights to Likely
Injunction Recipients
A third way that a pure licensor of a patent might realize the
economic advantages of injunctive relief concerning the patent-without
actually seeking any patent enforcement injunctions-is by transferring
ownership of the patent through an assignment to a holder that is a
potential manufacturer or user of the patented invention. Such a new
owner of the patent will be likely to qualify for an injunction enforcing
the relevant patent and, hence, will be willing to pay a fee for the patent
assignment that reflects the availability and economic value of injunctive
relief under the patent.
For example, if A is an owner and pure licensor of a patent and B is
a party with manufacturing capabilities regarding the patented invention,
B would be willing to pay A a fee for the assignment to B of the patent
that is computed based on B's estimate of the value of the patent as
enforced by injunctions obtained by B to prevent others from making the
patented invention. B would value the patent and the patent assignment
in this way because B could project that it could use its resources to
become a manufacturer of the patented item, qualify for an injunction
under the eBay factors, and through this type of injunction prevent others
from infringing the relevant patent.
This type of arrangement reflects a feature of all assets-a party
will pay for an asset based on the buyer's ability to use the asset, not the
seller's ability. Where a buyer has features that allow it to use an asset
in ways that a seller could not, the transfer price will tend to reflect the
value of the asset in its greater range of uses in the hands of the buyer.
In the patent context, the type of assignment described here merely
transfers the relevant patent into the hands of a party that can use the
patent more effectively than the transferor because the recipient can
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probably gain an injunction under the eBay test even though the
transferring party (as a pure licensor patent holder) could not have made
the same use of the patent. However, even though the transferor could
probably not have gained a patent enforcement injunction, the price that
will be paid to that party for transference of ownership of the relevant
patent through an assignment will reflect the full ability to gain a patent
enforcement injunction. Hence, this type of targeted patent assignment
will be a means to capitalize on the economic value of patent
enforcement injunctions if not to gain the injunctions themselves. The
advantages of this sort of strategy suggest that patent ownership may
tend to gravitate towards manufacturers and users of patented inventions
and away from pure licensor patent holders. However, the number of
patents obtained and enforced through injunctions many not change
much.
IV. IS THE BATTLE OVER RELIEF FOR PATENT TROLLS WORTH
FIGHTING OR WILL SPRUCED UP TROLLS BE INDISTINGUISHABLE FROM
PRODUCTIVE COMPETITORS?

These examples of means that parties can use to construct equities
and improve their chances of obtaining patent enforcement injunctions
suggests the futility of attempting to limit the business activities of so
called "patent trolls"-that is, pure licensor patent holders-through
application of the eBay factors. The strategic options of a pure licensor
patent holder are too fluid and the boundaries between pure licensors
and invention manufacturers and users too malleable to effectively draw
lines between types of patent interest holders that do or do not merit
patent enforcement injunctions.
Two types of complexities will arise if courts seek to use the eBay
test as a means to "police" "patent trolls" and cut down on injunctive
enforcement of patents by "patent trolls"
First, pure licensor patent holders will join in combinations with
other parties having more injunction-justifying features under the eBay
test. This article has profiled some of the combinations-such as joint
venture or exclusive licensing arrangements-that clever "patent trolls"
will use. This will force courts to resolve difficult questions about what
sorts of motivations underlying such combinations and what operating
features of the combinations should be taken into account in determining
whether a patent enforcement injunction should issue. In essence, courts
will need to determine what sorts of new activities in conjunction with a
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patent will transform a patent holder that does not merit an injunction
under the eBay analysis into one that does.
Second, even if a combination of a patent holder with another party
is not enough to justify a patent enforcement injunction based on the
new activities or characteristics of the combined parties, patent holders
will still have the option to transfer their patents by assignments to
parties who have the necessary features to gain patent enforcement
injunctions. This strategy will give pure patent licensors a means to gain
economic returns on their patents that reflect the value of patent
enforcement injunctions since recipients of the patents will pay
assignment fees that take the availability of injunctions into account.
Hence, the economic advantages of injunctive relief, if not the relief
itself, will still run to parties that were initially not manufacturers or
users of the patented inventions and would perhaps not have qualified
for patent enforcement injunctions themselves under the eBay standard.
Given these end results-and the substantial transaction costs that
courts and parties may suffer to reach these results-it seems doubtful
that the eBay standard offers a desirable means to change the practices or
scope of enforcement activities undertaken (or at least furthered) by
"patent trolls." Rather, the eBay criteria simply create a new set of
conduct targets which set the stage for new rounds of business
gamesmanship as parties plan for and execute the steps needed to
position themselves as attractive candidates for patent injunction
issuance under eBay. Given the ability of parties to work with the eBay
standard-that is, to work strategically within the eBay standard to
obtain about the same enforcement results that prevailed before eBaythe practical significance of this case in the world of the "patent troll"
may ultimately be very small.
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